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In a well-known passage from Jean-Paul Sartre's La Nausée, 
Roquentin records the following observation in his diary: 
For the most commonplace event to become an adventure, 
all you have to do is start recounting it. This is what fools 
people: a man is always a teller of tales, he lives 
surrounded by his stories and the stories of others, he 
sees everything that happens to him through them, and 
he tries to live his life as if he were recounting it. But you 
have to choose: to live or to recount.2 
In Roquentin's view, life should not be confused with narrative, for the 
essentially contingent quality of hfe is destroyed by any attempt to capture 
it in language. 
Readers of Simone de Beauvoir's extensive autobiographical writings 
might conclude that she did not experience Roquentin's difficulties with 
the narrative process. It seems that she effectively refused to choose 
between living and recounting, and instead opted for both. Few events 
occurred in Beauvoir's life which did not appear in some written form at 
some time. The scope ofher autobiographical project and the diversity of 
autobiographical forms employed by Beauvoir suggests an interesting 
relationship to the narration of identity which merits discussion. In this 
article, therefore, I will examine how Beauvoir negotiates some ofthe 
issues involved in the narration ofher own life, focusing particularly on her 
memoirs.3 
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In 1958, when only Mémoires d'une jeune fille rangée had been 
published of Beauvoir's autobiography, the psychoanalyst. Octave 
Mannoni observed in a lecture at the Collège de philosophie that 'one 
only has to read her memoirs to reaUse that since childhood she has always 
lived in an autobiographical relationship with herself.4 Mannoni claims 
not to be interested in the factual content of Beauvoir's autobiography, 
but rather in what her autobiography reveals to us about her perception of 
her life. The notion that Beauvoir has 'an autobiographical relationship 
with herself suggests that the existence of the Beauvoirian self is 
characterised by its activities of living and writing. The tautological notion 
of having an autobiographical relationship with oneself, implies a 
fragmented, somewhat narcissistic self, who observes, who records and 
who then observes herself recording. 
In terms of what is to be recorded by this narcissistic self. Octave 
Mannoni reminds us that Beauvoir's project in the Mémoires is 'to tell all 
and to allow nothing to be lost', and observes: 
But we've known for a long time that objectivity of this 
kind doesn't mean anything. Facts don't shape themselves 
independently into a narrative and memories don't 
spontaneously become a story. A life cannot be related in 
the same way one films the growth of a plant in accelerated 
motion.5 
Mannoni argues that such a project inevitably involves a conscious 
structuring of material. This structuring relies on two features: first, the 
ever-present notion ofthe protagonist's friture, which projects the narrative 
forward, and second, the narrator's self-positioning vis-à-vis the unsaid. 
He argues that a psychoanalytic influence appears to shape Beauvoir's 
autobiographical narrative, which he characterises as a stance of'I don't 
know, but I do know' in relation to the life related.6 
If we retum to Roquentin's problems with narrative, we might agree 
with Mark Freeman, who, in his discussion of ¿a Nausée, suggests that 
Roquentin suffers from a refusal to accept the narrative dimensions of life, 
confusing narrative with fiction and fiction with deception.7 Freeman argues, 
contra Roquentin's position, that producing narratives is one way in which 
we make sense of our experience. Narrative does not aim to reproduce 
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the experience lived, but acts as a frame within which that experience can 
become intelligible.8 Thus, in Beauvoir's case, we might view her 
production of autobiographical narratives as an attempt to render her 
experiences intelligible to herself and to others. A brief examination of 
how Beauvoir negotiates autobiography in statements of autobiographical 
intention may help us to understand why she envisages writing autobiography 
in this way. 
In La Force des choses, she includes some notes she made about her 
autobiographical project in the late 1950s which express her desire for 
total self-documentation. She writes: 
I have always secretly imagined that my life was being 
recorded down to the last detail, on some giant tape 
recorder, and that one day I would be able to play back 
the whole of my past. I'm almost fifty, it's too late to cheat: 
soon everything will sink into the abyss. Only the broad 
outlines of my life can be recorded on paper and by my 
own hand, so 1 shall make a book out of it. When I was 
fifteen I wanted people to read my biography and find it 
interesting and moving; this is why I hoped to become a 
"well-known author". Since then I have often considered 
writing it myself.9 
After completing La Force de l'âge, the second volume ofher memoirs, 
Beauvoir comments again on her desire for self-documentation, in an 
interview with Madeleine Chapsal. She said: 'I would like to have a vast 
amount of documentation about my life. I'd find it fascinating. 'l0 Asked 
by Chapsal whether she was adopting a psychoanalytic approach, 
Beauvoir replied: 
No. It would have obviously been necessary to start from 
my childhood in order to study things from a 
psychoanalytic perspective. I was not very interested in 
seeking out the childhood origins of my adult life when I 
related it afterwards. I should have talked about them in 
the first volume, if it is necessary to talk about them at all. 
When I've finished writing these memoirs, maybe I'll have 
to think about them from a different point of view. For the 
moment I'm only concemed with my conscious life, and 
not with its unconscious motivations. I point out aspects 
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of my life which remain incomprehensible to me and where 
necessary, I try and explain them. But it's not the most 
important thing as far as I'm concemed." 
Yet as Octave Mannoni observes, one ofthe ways 'an autobiographical 
relationship with oneself might manifest itself in autobiography is through 
a psychoanalytic form. This might ideally entail the elements ofthe 
unconscious and the unsaid being acknowledged and expressed. However, 
in Beauvoir's autobiography, as Mannoni points out, she respects the 
unconscious for being precisely unconscious, and as constituting an aspect 
of her existence which is not available to her. Thus he arçjues that the type 
of tmth at which Beauvoir aims is of a different order to that which might 
be provided by a psychoanalytic autobiographical method. It is rather a 
form of clarity and sincerity in the narration ofher story or, as Josyane 
Savigneau has noted, 'the determination to assess herself lucidly' in the 
production of a narrative which assumes a tmth in its totality rather than in 
isolated incidents.12 
A number of hypotheses may be offered for Beauvoir's rejection of a 
psychoanalytic method in favour of a project of testimony, some of which 
pertain to what Michel Contât has referred to as the ethical dimension of 
Beauvoir's autobiography. Contal has described Beauvoir's memoirs as 
'texts which aim at moral edification rather than tmth' and has accused 
her of sacrificing literature to ethics.13 However, I would argue that 
Beauvoir's autobiographical project is not merely a slavish attempt to 
edify her readers and to idealise her past. In her autobiography, a notion 
of tmth as testimony, as a narrative of experience which relies on self-
presence andpresence, appears to operate rather than a juridical notion 
of tmth as an absence of falsehood.14 This testimonial notion of tmth may 
explain why Beauvoir envisages the narrative task as 'telling all'. 
In many ways the memoirs may be viewed as a narrative concemed 
with Beauvoir's different experiences as a survivor - a survivor ofher 
bourgeois upbringing, a survivor of the death ofher friend Zaza, a female 
survivor within a predominantly male and non-feminist intellectual peer 
group, and as a survivor of, and witness to, some ofthe most traumatic 
events in twentieth-cenmry history. In the face of such experiences, to 
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remain silent, to abandon narrative and to proclaim that 'tme stories' do 
not exist, as Roquentin does, at one point in La Nausée, appears to be 
an unethical stance if Beauvoir's autobiography is to function on a 
testimonial level. In this context 'telling all', as an act of speaking out in 
autobiography, assumes a moral rather than a sensationalist or a naive 
dimension. 
However, testimonial autobiography places a different set of demands 
on the reader as the receiver ofthe testimony. Dori Laub has argued in his 
work on testimonial accounts ofthe Holocaust that: 
Insofar as they [survivors] remind us of a horrible, 
traumatic past, insofar as they bear witness to our own 
historical disfiguration, survivors frighten us. They pose 
for us a riddle and a threat from which we cannot turn 
away. We are indeed profoundly terrified to truly face the 
traumas of our history, much like the survivor and the 
listener arc.15 
It may be this fear ofthe survivor (both on a personal and a collective 
level) and ofthe female subject as witness to history that, in part, explains 
'the striking hostility' among critics which Toril Moi has exposed in her 
survey of Beauvoir's reception.16 
Telling all is an ambitious project, and one which finds its roots in 
Beauvoir's bourgeois Catholic childhood. As a child, Beauvoir had been 
well-trained by her pious mother in religious practice: she went to 
confession twice a month, prayed between classes at her private Catholic 
school, went on annual retreats, received communion three times a week 
and read a chapter of L 'Imitation de Jésus-Christ every morning. 
Frequently in her autobiography Beauvoir likens her literary vocation to 
religious belief. In the interview with Madeleine Chapsal at the end ofthe 
1950s, Beauvoir explained how she envisaged her literary vocation: 'As 
far as I was concemed, writing was a mission, it was salvation, it replaced 
God'.17 As a child, Simone was trained in confession, in the production of 
narratives which not only served to make sense ofher experience before 
a confessor, but which also had a disciplinary function in that they were 
subject to moral censure. 
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In La Volonté de savoir, Michel Foucault describes confession as 
one ofthe main rituals we have relied on for the production of tmth about 
the self since the Middle Ages.18 Confession is at the heart of enforced 
individuation and functions as a disciplinary practice in numerous domains 
to produce the tmth ofthe self. Foucault argues that confession is so 
profoundly entrenched in our concept and production of identity that we 
no longer recognise it as a disciplinary effect. 
Following Foucault, we might therefore view Beauvoir's project of 
'telling all', given her particularly pious upbringing, as evidence ofher 
acting as a 'jeune fille rangée' or 'dutiful daughter', by conforming with 
the injunction to confess. However, such an interpretation would, in my 
view, be rather facile, because it overlooks the specific conditions in which 
autobiographical discourses are produced, and (to articulate a Foucauldian 
criticism) it assumes that power operates in a monolithic, rather than in a 
local, generative way. 'Telling all' is never possible, for the narrative is 
always produced within a given context, fixed by time, place and the 
listening position of one's interlocutor. As such the operation of power 
within the confessional scenario is always, as Beauvoir might say, 'en 
situation' or limited by the context in which it occurs. 
If we consider the project of telling all within autobiography, it can be 
argued that autobiography's historic links to confession and truth-telling 
and its considerable investment in Westem bourgeois androcentrism, 
frequently reinforced by autobiography criticism, make it hard to envisage 
autobiography as simply a contingent narrative otganisation of anyone's 
experience. Autobiography constitutes a highly politicised form of writing, 
at the intersection of competing notions of tmth, authority, identity, 
subjecthood and literature. 
In Beauvoir's case, I would argue that the combination ofher use of a 
traditional autobiographical form, her concem to represent the tmth of 
her experience, and her stance of discursive mastery has provoked a 
suspicious and sceptical response from traditional liberal humanist critics, 
as well as from critics influenced by psychoanalysis and poststmcturahsm. 
This may be the result of Beauvoir's determination to play the role of 
witness, both publically and privately. In a traditionally patriarchal Westem 
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culture which has historically aligned men's role with objective tmth and 
authority, and women with subjectivity and lying, it is difficult for the female 
witness's testimony to be received as authoritative.19 Thus, even Jane 
Heath, who offers a feminist, Lacanian reading of some of Beauvoir's 
fiction and autobiography, describes her own critical approach to the 
autobiography as 'suspicious' and as 'an attempt to demystify the "cultural 
phenomenon"', created largely by Beauvoir's autobiography, according 
to Heath.20 However, if we consider how the narrator positions herself in 
relation to the life to be told, there is evidence that the tmth at which the 
narrator aims is not a mimetic tmth which aims to reproduce events exactly 
and objectively, as Mark Freeman describes Roquentin's 'tme stories', 
but rather a testimonial tmth, which relies on the narrator's presence and 
experiences ofthe events related.21 Being there and recording one's 
subjective experience ofthe event appears to be ultimately more important 
for Beauvoir. Thus in the light of this particular testimonial tmth, we might 
usefully assess her project of telling all. 
From La Force de l'âge onwards, she negotiates the telling ofher 
story regularly with the reader in the prologues, mid-textual reflections or 
epilogues ofher texts.22 Beauvoir describes the long-standing need she 
had to relate her life story in order to record something ofher past selves 
in the prologue to La Force de l'âge. Yet, she makes clear that she will 
not confess all. Any omissions or slight errors will not detract from the 
overall tmth in Beauvoir's view. Later in Tout compte fait, writing about 
André Malraux's Antimémoires, Beauvoir describes omission as 'the 
most insidious form of lying' and condemns Malraux for his silence and 
mythomania.23 This illustrates an interesting conflict in Beauvoir's 
autobiographical methodology: on one hand she is drawn to the complete 
confession à la Rousseau, yet on the other, she seems to be aware ofthe 
impossibility of this desired self-totalisation, this 'telling all ', particularly as 
a woman writer who had caused some outrage among members ofthe 
French establishment by writing Le Deuxième sexe. Her method seems 
to be to represent a testimony of experience by relating the life largely 
chronologically in its contingent detail. 
By the end ofthe first part of La Force de l'âge, Beauvoir's initial 
project of'telling all' has been modified. Reaffirming her belief in Sartre's 
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early theory of a transcendental ego,24 she concludes that a major reason 
for undertaking to write her autobiography was that one can never know 
oneselfbut can only offer an account of oneself.25 Through the production 
of narrative, the autobiographical subject is able to gain a knowledge 
about her life as a sum of particular experiences. Asserting that self-
knowledge is impossible, Beauvoir thereby relinquishes a certain authority 
within the confessional stmcture of traditional autobiography (which usually 
foregrounds self-knowledge as necessary for autobiographical authority). 
She effectively refuses to analyse her story in terms of any tmth or 
epistemological value it might have and it is left to the reader to decide the 
value of her testimony. 
In the prologue to La Force des choses, Beauvoir defends her 
documentary approach by saying that the inclusion ofthe minutiae ofher 
life proves the veracity ofher story. She also re-asserts her authoritative 
position as narrator, particularly in relation to psychoanalysis, (according 
to her notion of autobiography as providing a tmth of experience rather 
than self-knowledge) saying, 'If I am describing myself, nothing frightens 
me'.26 She concedes the existence of a number of errors in her story and 
declares, 'I repeat that I have never deliberately cheated'.27 She claims 
her good faith here in offering a lucid account ofher life. 
In the final volume ofher autobiography. Tout compte fait, Beauvoir 
temporarily abandons her chronological method for a thematic account of 
her life. She comments: 
Building up a picture of myself: I am not interested in this 
pointless and in any case impossible undertaking. What I 
would like is to have an idea of my situation in the world. 
Being a woman, French, a writer, to be sixty-four years old 
in 1972: what does that mean?28 
Here Beauvoir makes her interests clear: to situate herself within various 
networks of identification - gender, nationality, profession, age, historical 
location - rather than offering a self portrait. 
Beauvoir's role as witness in her memoirs consistently takes pre-eminent 
importance. Ten years after finishing her autobiography, she commented 
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in an interview with Deirdre Bair that, 'the autobiographcr has to be like a 
policeman writing his report: accuracy is paramount'.29 She added that, 
unlike Colette's autobiographical writings, her memoirs could really be 
called autobiography because they were 'so total and complete, at least 
in the sense that they recount my entire life'. Here, Beauvoir attempts to 
locate her autobiographical practice somewhere between a juridical notion 
of autobiography, which relies on the production of facts and objective 
tmth, and a notion of women's autobiographical practice (exemplified by 
Colette) which she represents as discontinuous and subjectively 
impressionistic. Once more, telling all takes priority over telling a mimetic 
tmth. As Leigh Gilmore has noted in her discussion of autobiography: 
The very act of confessing seems almost to conspire 
against the one bound to tell the truth. That is, in telling 
the truth, autobiographers usually narrate, and thereby 
shift the emphasis to telling the truth.30 
As I have argued, Beauvoir's project of telling all in her autobiography 
does not claim to tell all in the sense of offering a definitive, objective tmth 
ofthe life recounted. The Beauvoirian fantasy of self-totalisation, in which 
every contingent detail of life can be definitively and accurately recorded, 
is demonstrated to be blatantiy fictive early in her autobiographical project. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, there are tensions evident in Beauvoir's 
negotiations with the reader between the fantasy of telling 'the' definitive 
tmth in autobiography and her recognition that she can only provide a 
narrative of experience. 
In L'Écriture et la différence, Jacques Derrida, in bis discussion of 
Lévi-Strauss and totalisation, suggests there is another option when faced 
with the inability to represent the world in language. He says we can try 
and come to terms with the non-possibility of language ever representing 
anything other than language. According to this view, there is no discrete 
encounter between language and the world, our experience always already 
exists in language.31 There is, therefore, no finite interpretation or tmth of 
correspondence to be obtained. Roquentin's dilemma of whether to live 
or to relate would therefore be illusory, for it assumes that there is a stance 
to take outside language. Yet in the meantime he has been producing 
narratives, like everyone else, by writing his diary in order to try and 
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make sense ofhis experience. In this context, Beauvoir's commitment to 
the narrative task of testimonial autobiography demonstrates the ethical 
importance of living O/K/recounting.32 
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